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ABSTRACT 
The characterization of individual firms is an essential step toward the study of the behaviour 
of industries and other more aggregated units of economics, and so to the analysis of 
economic growth processes. Hence, the main goal of this study is to achieve a critical 
discussion around the conceptualisation of the firm and its role in the dynamical process of 
economic growth.  
The approach to the main topic starts with the construction of a theoretical matrix of the 
economics of the firm, opening with the two major traditions of institutionalist thought in 
economics, and evolving then towards some considerations around the contractual and the 
evolutionary approaches. Another important theoretical stream that deals with organizations 
in economic and sociological terms also appears, the population ecology approach. After this 
overview, it is developed a cross-exam of distinct theoretical perspectives and the 
identification of possible flaws of the neoclassical theory. This confrontation, which goes 
throughout many imperative and controversial issues within economics such as the nature of 
the firm and the cognitive capacities of economic agents, results in a systematisation about the 
impact of this discussion on economic growth. The conclusions appear as crucial to develop 
further research aiming the construction of economic growth models based on a 
microeconomics that is closer to the reality of firms. 
KEYWORDS: Firm; Economic Growth; Institutionalism; Evolutionary theory; Contractual 
Theory; Ecology Population Theory 
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1 ‘It is our strongly held belief, however, that modeling at an industry – or an economy 
– wide level ought to be guided and constrained by a plausible theory of firm 
capabilities and behavior that is consistent with the microcosmic evidence.’ (Nelson 
and Winter 1982: 52) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The main motivation behind this paper is a definite believe on the idea that the 
characterization of individual firms is a crucial step toward the study of the behaviour of 
industries and other more aggregated units of economics, and so to the analysis of economic 
growth processes. Therefore, the key goal is to achieve a critical discussion around the 
conceptualisation of the firm and its role in the dynamical process of economic growth.  
As it is widely known, economic growth theory is usually identified with neoclassical growth 
models that, even in the so-called endogenous growth theory, consider the firm as an 
anonymous production function (Foss 1997: 37). However, at the analysis of industry level 
phenomena the firm has a role to play. We may ask whether a conceptualisation of the firm 
distinct from the one adopted by the neoclassical frame has important implications in more 
aggregated analysis.      
The identification of inadequacies in neoclassical economic growth theory by more or less 
dissent economists is a standard event. However, the recognition of limitations by 
investigators that belong to the mainstream itself, for example Philippe Aghion and Peter 
Howitt, is clearly a testimony that much is still to be thought and appraised in that theoretical 
approach. One important limitation pointed out by Aghion and Howitt (1998) in their book 
Endogenous Growth Theory is the lack of attention devoted to institutions and transaction 
costs, almost completely ignored by endogenous growth literature (Aghion et. al. 1997). They 
also consider as shortcomings the representation of firms and R&D activities in endogenous 
growth models, strongly believing in the need to understand the financial and institutional 
aspects of R&D. Moreover, they stress that the discard of the representative agent assumption 
would allow these models to ‘incorporate the political dimension of “creative destruction”’ 
(Aghion and Howitt 1998: 67). 
New Institutional Economics (Williamson 1985, Coase 1937, North 1981, 1990) deals mainly 
with the problem of defining the boundary between the market and the firm, keeping the 
individualist assumption of neoclassical theory. The crucial question it asks is: If the market is 
an efficient co-ordinator, why are some activities combined together in firms rather than being 
coordinated through markets? Why making products inside the firm, when the firm can buy 
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variable. As a matter of fact, while usually neoclassical theory assumes market and internal 
business transactions as costless, this school reminds that the market exchange is featured by 
many distinct types of costs: search costs, costs of bargaining, costs of monitoring and 
enforcing contractual agreements. Also the internal business transactions have associated 
costs such as management costs of co-ordinating production, and costs of monitoring and 
supervising the workforce. 
The concept of transaction costs represents in a certain extent a departure from the 
neoclassical theory. Transactions are costly because information is incomplete and there is 
uncertainty about future economic environment. Also, there is the problem that economic 
agents are opportunistic. Since information is limited, opportunism increases the costs and 
risks of market transactions.  
Once argued that the concept of transaction costs is coupled with problems of information and 
uncertainty we cannot reject bounded rationality (Hodgson 1999: 209). This concept, brought 
up by Simon (1956, 1957), recognises not only that information is incomplete but also the 
existence of important cognitive limitations on human rationality. Therefore, decisions are 
based on partial information because the ability of the human mind for formulate and solve 
complex problems is limited. This notion of rationality implies that a firm cannot achieve the 
optimum maximum for its goals such as profits. Instead, the firm search for new options until 
it finds a satisfactory one. This means that the decision-making process is one of satisfacing 
rather than maximising as occurs in neoclassical approach. Rules are crucial for achieving 
satisfactory results (Simon 1956). This emphasis on bounded rationality and satisfacing 
behaviour have led the theorists within this approach to be concerned more with firm’s 
internal decision-making processes departing from the neoclassical economists´ emphasis in 
the firm’s outcomes. 
Old institutionalism stresses the role of norms and culture in understanding and explaining 
institutions such as the firm and markets. John Commons (e.g. 1925, 1931) was crucial for the 
development of this framework, having based his work on the idea that economic activity was 
dependent on the fundamental legal and institutional connections, and that these evolved over 
time (Backhouse 2002: 199). This school has influenced two theoretical approaches: the 
Behavioural theories and the Managerial theories. The first ones emphasize the idea that 
firm’s goals are achieved from compromises among a coalition of crucial players within the 
firm. The second ones stress the role of professional managers in defining a firm’s objectives, 
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income) and those of shareholders (maximise profits). 
Evolutionary economics is strongly related to the old intuitionalist vision. It clearly selects 
processes and routines as the key elements (Nelson and Winter 1982) that allow a firm to deal 
with uncertainty justifying firm’s actions. Faced with uncertainty, firms are characterised by 
bounded rationality with their decisions being made based on rules and routines. Nelson and 
Winter (1982: 14) stress the concept of routine as carrying the accumulated skill and 
knowledge of the firm. ‘Our general term for all regular and predictable behavioral patterns of 
firms is “routine”’.  
One of the most important issues in the study of evolutionary economic processes is path 
dependency that is, how history matters (Andersen 1994). So, in this approach the options 
made by the firm are also path-dependent as the decisions made in the past determines what 
the firm is able to do in the future. Penrose (1959) already emphasized that the only way to 
fully understand the pattern of diversification of a certain firm was explaining it being aware 
of its prior development of capabilities.  
A rationalization around the nature and role of an organization such as the firm should take 
into account the contributions brought by Michael Hannan and John Freeman’s population 
ecology perspective on organizations-environment relations. This approach has many 
convergent points with the evolutionary theoretical framework such as its emphasis on 
selection processes and the adoption of similar cognitive conceptions and similar ways of 
perceiving the future. 
It is important to note that, more recently, neoclassical economists, recognising that the 
assumption of full knowledge is unsatisfactory, tried to deal with the fact that entrepreneurs 
cannot know the future with certainty (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1992). Risk was incorporated 
into the neoclassical framework by assuming that firms consider the probability of all possible 
future results associated to its decision-making. However, it is clear that in some 
circumstances firms are not able to assign probabilities to possible outcomes or they may not 
even know all the feasible results (Silverberg and Verspagen 1997). These situations are 
referred as uncertainty (ibid.). The economist is faced with a new problem: to know how 
decision-makers behave under uncertainty.  
In an attempt to deal with such wide theoretical considerations and accomplish our main goal 
- to achieve a critical discussion around the conceptualisation of the firm and its role in the 
  4dynamical process of economic growth -, this paper is organized in the following way. In 
section two it is briefly presented what intends to be the theoretical matrix of the economics 
of the firm, starting with the two major traditions of institutionalist thought in economics, and 
evolving then towards some considerations around the contractual and the evolutionary 
approaches. Also within this section appears an important theoretical stream that deals with 
organizations in economic and sociological terms: the population ecology approach. After this 
overview, section three consists in a cross-exam of distinct theoretical perspectives and 
identification of possible flaws of the neoclassical theory. This confrontation, which goes 
throughout many imperative and controversial issues within economics such as the nature of 
the firm and the cognitive capacities of economic agents, results then in our final section, 
where a systematisation about the impact of this discussion on economic growth is rehearsed.    
2. THEORETICAL MATRIX OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
2.1 The two major traditions of institutionalist thought in economics: The Old 
Institutionalist Economics and the New Institutionalist Economics  
An overview of theoretical approaches that tried to incorporate issues relating to institutions 
and institutional change within economics must comprise two major traditions of 
institutionalist thought.
1 The first is the American institutionalist school that began at the turn 
of the century and has continued incessantly to this day, though with large moves back and 
forth in popularity and prestige. The second is a more recent perspective that, in a significant 
extent, can be seen as a revitalization and extension of the institutionalist elements to be found 
in classical, neoclassical, and Austrian economics (Rutherford 1994: 1). Nowadays, the 
former approach is usually labelled as the ‘old’ institutional economics (henceforth OIE) 
while the latter is called the ‘new’ institutional economics (henceforth NIE). 
Within the OIE we have the tradition of thought associated with Thorstein Veblen, Wesley 
Mitchell, John R. Commons, and Clarence Ayres, and more recently the contributions of 
Allan Gruchy, Wendell Gordon, Marc Tool (Rutherford, 1994: 1). Two main research 
                                                 
1 According to Rutherford (1994), the term ‘institution’ may be defined in terms similar to those found in Veblen 
([1914] 1964: 7) and in Schotter (1981: 11). ‘An institution is a regularity of behaviour or a rule that is generally 
accepted by members of a social group, that specifies behaviour in specific situation, and that is either self-
policed or policed by external authority. It is important to distinguish between general social rules (sometimes 
called the institutional environment) and particular organizational forms (sometimes called institutional 
arrangements). Although organizations can also be thought of as sets of rules, the rules apply only internally. 
Organizations have constitutions, are collective actors and are also subject to social rules’ (Rutherford 1994: 182, 
footnote 1). 
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Ayres. ‘This program is built around the concept of a fundamental dichotomy between the 
business or pecuniary and the industrial aspects of the economy. This is also expressed in a 
more general way as a dichotomy between institutional and technological or between 
ceremonial and instrumental ways of doing and thinking’ (Rutherford 1994: 1-2). Broadly, 
this programme intends to explore the impact of new technology on institutional 
arrangements, and the ways in which the social conventions and the interests already 
established resist to such transformation. Typically, these ideas are now associated to a view 
of the structure of the modern economy that highlights the political and economic power of 
large corporate interests (ibid.: 2). 
The work of John R. Commons and the more recent analyses developed by authors such as 
Warren Samuels and Alland Schmid (Schmid 1978, Samuels and Schmid 1981) correspond to 
the second key programme within the OIE. This approach focuses on law, property rights and 
organizations, their evolution and impact on legal and economic power, economic 
transactions, and the distribution of income (Rutherford 1994: 2). 
Rutherford (1994) also emphasizes that distinct perspectives characterize the NIE. One major 
approach is to be found in the work of property rights (Demsetz 1967, Alchian and Demsetz 
1973) and common law (Posner 1977, 1981). Another one is that concerned with public 
choice processes, comprising those involving rent seeking and the actions of distributive 
coalitions (Olson 1982, Mueller 1989). A third important facet analyses organizations and 
includes the agency theory developed from Jensen and Meckling (1976), and also work on 
transaction costs game theorists, ‘some of whom use game theory primarily to model action 
within given institutional situations (Shubik 1975), while others use it in a more ambitious 
attempt to explain the evolution of the social institutions themselves (Schotter 1981). Many of 
these elements can be found combined in the institutional economic history of Douglass 
North (1981, 1990)’ (Rutherford (1994: 3). 
2.2 The two central economic approaches within the theory of the firm: the evolutionary 
and the contractual approaches 
In this section it is presented an overview on what are arguably the two dominant economic 
approaches to the theory of the firm – the contractual and the competence-based (Foss. 1997: 
1).
2 Both these perspectives took-off at the beginning of the 1970s with contributions such as 
                                                 
2 Also labelled as resource-based or capabilities theories of the firm (Hodgson 1999: 247).  
  6Alchian and Demsetz (1972), in the first line of thought, and Nelson and Winter (1982) in the 
second one.  
Evolutionary and Competence-Based Theories of the Firm  
Hodgson (1999) offers an analysis of evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm. 
The former can be regarded as a subset of the latter. The wider approach of competence-based 
theories advocates that the existence, structure and boundaries of the firm have as an 
important determinant the associated existence of individual or team competences, for 
example skills and tacit knowledge, which are promoted and sustained by the organization 
(Hodgson 1999: 247-8). This view was supported in the past by ancestors such as Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx who considered the division of labour as the essential key to the 
enlargement of the skills. However, it is in the twentieth century that we find the major 
exponents of such approach, remarkably Frank Knight (1921), Edith Penrose (1959), George 
Richardson (1972), and Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982).  
Hodgson (1999: 248) stresses that ‘the central idea of competences provides the basis for 
evolutionary and non-equilibrium theories of industrial competition and development.’ 
Therefore, there is room here to explore the potential implications of these approaches on 
economic growth theory.  
Within the frame of competence-based theories it is possible to identify diverse perspectives, 
particularly over the nature of tacit knowledge, the units and methodology of analysis, and the 
use of the evolutionary paradigm (Hodgson 1999: 248).  
One of the most important subsets of the competence-based perspective is evolutionary 
theorizing. The key mentors of modern evolutionary economics are Richard Nelson and 
Sidney Winter. In their (1982) book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change they offer 
a wide theory, with specific associated models that incorporate basic assumptions distinct 
from the ones prevailing on orthodox theory of firm and industry behaviour. 
The discussion on the economics of the firm demands a brief look at the characterization of 
evolutionary economics. On the grounds of firms’ behaviour the evolutionary reasoning puts 
the concept of ‘routine’. It captures all regular and predictable behavioural patterns of firms. 
The routine embodies a wide range of firms’ features since technical specifications for 
production to procedures for hiring and firing, investment policies, research and development, 
advertising or business strategies (Nelson and Winter 1982). ‘In our evolutionary theory, 
these routines play the role that genes play in biological evolutionary theory. They are a 
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is determined also by the environment); they are heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s 
organisms generated from today’s … have many of the same characteristics, and they are 
selectable in the sense that organisms with certain routines may do better than others, and, if 
so, their relative importance in the population (industry) is augmented over time’ (ibid.: 14). 
Of course, as Nelson and Winter (1982: 15) highlight an important part of business behaviour 
is not able to be embedded in the term ‘routine’, either from the point of view of the firm or 
the society. Within evolutionary theorizing what is listed under the concept of ‘routine’ is 
what consists the regular and predictable of business behaviour, therefore including the 
relative constant dispositions and strategic heuristics that mould the way firms’ deal with the 
‘nonroutine’ problems. Also, ‘the fact that not all business behavior follows regular and 
predictable patterns is accommodated in evolutionary theory by recognizing that there are 
stochastic elements both in the determination of decisions and of decision outcomes’ (ibid.: 
15).  
Contractual or Contractarian Theories of the Firm 
Another large set of theories of the firm is usually labelled as contractual or contractarian. To 
these theories the heart of attention is not on the resources and skills developed within the 
firm but on explicit and implicit contracts between employers, employees and other 
contractors. ‘That is, firms and other institutions are seen as alternative bundles of contracts, 
understood as mechanisms for creating and realigning incentives’ (Langlois and Foss 1997: 
5). This approach comes from the work of Ronald Coase (1937) and highlights the cost of 
making and monitoring transactions (Hodgson 1999: 248).  
This contractarian approach is featured by somehow distinct theories. Hodgson (1999: 248-9) 
recalls Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) who stressed the distinction between markets and 
hierarchies. He also evokes Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) who impose no such 
division but see monitoring or metering costs as critical. Oliver Hart, Grossman and John 
Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1983, 1986; Hart, 1988, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1990) propose 
another important contractarian approach to the theory of the firm, focusing on a formal 
analysis of incomplete contracting and the principal-agent problem. But, in spite of their 
differences, ‘all these exponents see the informational and other difficulties in formulating, 
monitoring and policing contracts as the crucial explanatory elements. In particular, work in 
the Coase-Williamson tradition is described as ‘transaction cost’ economics, because of its 
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248-9). Therefore, while the ‘evolutionary’ perspective is a subset of competence-based 
theories of the firm, ‘transaction cost’ theories is a subset of the contractual approach. 
Recently, many writers have claimed that the evolutionary perspective to the firm is a serious 
alternative to the contractual approach, as the evolutionary theory seems to be able to address 
the essential investigating frame of the contractual line, namely the existence, boundaries and 
internal organization of the firm, making use of an explanatory loom that is fundamentally 
distinct from the one used by the contractual perspective (Foss, 1997: 1). This distance 
appears immediately on the reasons pointed to the existence of the firm. Instead of the 
contractual rationalization in terms of firms’ ability to efficiently line up incentives of the 
diverse input-owners that participate in productive activities under certain circumstances, the 
evolutionary theorists claim that firms exist because they are better institutional arrangements 
for accumulating specific productive knowledge (ibid). So, the explanatory mechanisms 
invoked are different. 
Although the overview above seem to mean a relation of theoretical competition between the 
contractual and the competence perspectives, some hybrid analyses have been emerging from 
the incorporation of both perspectives. Based on a taxonomy extracted from the philosophy of 
sciences, Foss (1997) tries to compare those approaches, aiming to provide the illustration of 
reasoning areas where evolutionary and contractual insights get in touch. ‘Indeed, the 
plausibility of hybrid explanations may stem from the complex nature of economic reality and 
the fact that a number of causal mechanisms are simultaneously at work. As long as they do 
not involve internal inconsistencies, plural rather than singular explanation may, in principle, 
be possible and plausible’ (Hodgson 1999: 249). Richard Langlois (Langlois, 1992; Langlois 
and Robertson, 1995) David Teece and Gary Pisano (1994) are examples of such plural 
works. They emphasize human learning and the improvement of competences within the firm 
while recognizing the role of transaction costs.
3  
2.3 ‘Beyond’ the theory of the firm: the population ecology of organizations 
One thread of literature born within the sociological theory – The Population Ecology of 
Organizations – is also relevant to understand economic evolution and the role of 
organizations such as the firm in the evolutionary process. Particularly important to the 
                                                 
3 Langlois (1992) identifies what he calls ‘dynamic transaction costs’ as costs emerging from particular problems 
of coordination, precisely the coordination of knowledge, learning and expectations that are basic for an 
understanding of internal organization (Foss 1997).  
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explanations for changing rates of organizational population. 
Michael Hannan and John Freeman started their research programme in the 1970s and they 
were particularly inspired by the human ecology principles developed by the sociologist 
Amos Hawley. Hannan and Freeman (1977) proposed a population ecology perspective on 
organization-environment relations as an alternative to the leading adaptation perspective. As 
they stress, while the ecological approaches focus on selection, most of the literature on 
organizations adopts the already mentioned adaptation perspective. The authors recognize that 
at least some of the connection between structure and environment must reflect adaptive 
behaviour or learning. However, they claim that there is no reason to presume that the vast 
structural variability among organizations reveals only or even mainly adaptation.  
To sustain such claim they start pointing out the existence of several obvious limitations on 
the ability of organizations to adapt. What they mean is the presence of a number of processes 
responsible for structural inertia, which are strongly connected to organizations’ adaptive 
flexibility. The authors recall that this subject has been mainly ignored by research, except the 
suggestions made by Burns and Stalker (1961) and Stinchcombe (1965).  
It is important to stress that it was Stinchcombe (1965) who asked why, in general, a higher 
proportion of new organizations fail than old ones. He then points out the significant role of 
the ‘liability of newness’. Particularly when this liability is extremely large, organizational 
innovation will tend to be accepted only when the alternatives are severe, for example in 
wartime. The author illustrates with some aspects that make up the liability of newness and 
asks how do social circumstances influence the degree of liability. 
Stinchcombe starts emphasizing that new organizations involve new roles that have to be 
learned, and that the process of creating new roles has important costs in time, concern, 
divergences and temporary inefficiency. He then stresses the importance of standard social 
routines in the organization culture of the population that work out many such problems, for 
example cost accounting and inventory control systems, hence being crucial to the reduction 
of the liability of newness. Another important factor to reduce such liability is the existence of 
a disciplined and responsible work force, combined with social routines favourable to 
responsible initiative. 
Michael Hannan and John Freeman, inspired by Stinchcombe’s ideas, developed their theory 
on waves of organizing by pointing out a number of reasons for anticipating organizational 
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competitive advantages from the stability of their internal social relationships and on the basis 
of their relationships with other organizations. This often leads to the development of 
ideologies and traditions that at once legitimate the status quo and dampen innovative 
tendencies. In addition, basic changes in product, technology, and organizational structure 
threaten to upset patterns of accommodation that were often quite expensive to develop.’ 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) point out internal structural arrangements and environmental 
limits responsible for inertial pressures. As internal constraints they suggest: sunk costs; 
constraints on the received information; internal political constraints; and constraints 
generated by the organizations’ own history.  
On external pressures towards inertia they suggest: legal and fiscal barriers to entry and exit 
from markets; external constraints upon the availability of information; and legitimacy 
constraints (ibid.). 
Then, the authors claim that in order to deal with inertial pressures the adaptation perspective 
must be complemented with a selection approach. Within this broader analysis, two issues 
emerge as vital: the election of appropriate units of analysis (Hannan and Freeman argue for a 
clear focus on populations of organizations); the applicability of population ecology models to 
the analysis of human social organization. On this last issue they start with Hawley’s (1950) 
classic statement on human ecology, then extending Hawley’s work in two ways: by using 
explicit competition models to detail the process producing isomorphism between 
organizational structure and environmental demands, and by using niche theory to expand the 
problem to dynamic environments.  
We have seen in our work that the wider approach of competence-based theories advocates 
that the existence, structure and boundaries of the firm have as an important determinant the 
associated existence of individual or team competences, for example skills and tacit 
knowledge, which are promoted and sustained by the organization (Hodgson 1999: 247-8). 
Therefore, the theorizing built by the population ecology (or organizational ecology theory) 
has many convergent points with the above approach.  
Coase (1937), one of the most important authors within New Institutionalism Economics, 
identified the firm in terms of organizational coordination. Edith Penrose, consensually 
considered as one of the most important precursors of the competence-based approach, shared 
such a notion of firm. Penrose (1959: 24) perceived the firm as ‘a collection of productive 
  11resources the disposal of which between different uses and over time is determined by 
administrative decision.’ 
Our work has been concerned with the way economics deals with institutions to ultimately 
accomplish our main goal, achieving a critical discussion around the conceptualisation of the 
firm and its role in the dynamical process of economic growth. It may be pertinent to recall 
that ‘institution’, following the definition offered by Rutherford (1994: 182) [cf. footnote 1], 
corresponds to ‘a regularity of behaviour or a rule that is generally accepted by members of a 
social group, that specifies behaviour in specific situation, and that is either self-policed or 
policed by external authority. It is important to distinguish between general social rules 
(sometimes called the institutional environment) and particular organizational forms 
(sometimes called institutional arrangements)’. About organizations, Rutherford (1994: 182) 
focus that ‘although organizations can also be thought of as sets of rules, the rules apply only 
internally. Organizations have constitutions, are collective actors and are also subject to social 
rules.’  
For Hannan and Freeman (1984), a population of firms is a group of organizations sharing a 
common dependency on their material and social environment and on the resources they can 
attain.
4 Therefore, the firm is seen as an organization and their definition of organization has 
its roots in Stinchcombe (1965: 142)’s proposal, which conceives organization as a ‘set of 
stable social relations deliberately created with the explicit intention of continuously 
accomplishing some specific goals or purposes.’ There is convergence with the concept 
typically embraced by the institutionalist perspective in economics: if organizations have 
‘constitutions’ as Rutherford pointed out, they share ‘specific goals or purposes’ and if they 
correspond to ‘collective actors’, they are ‘a set of social relations’.  
Our research effort around the conceptualisation of the firm must involve the population 
ecology approach since there is clear convergence on the basic level of analysis, even if 
evaluated at distinct levels.  
Figure 1 below offers a schematic representation of distinct theoretical proposals. On one 
hand we have the two major traditions of institutionalist thought in economics and the more 
                                                 
4 Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1989) consider that their conceptualisation is in favour of the Darwinian theory of 
change and selection, rather than Lamarck’s notion. The Lamarckian process means that human actors and firms 
learn and include learning into their behavioural repertoires. In the Darwinian form, the fitness adaptation 
crucially depends on the environment selecting organizational forms. ‘Thus, in the Darwinian competitive 
process, ‘if there is a rationality in play, it is the rationality of natural selection’ (Hannan and Freeman 1977 
quoted from Durand 2001: 400). 
  12recent developments associated to each of them or to both at the same time. On the other, we 
have a schedule of the main contributions to the emergence of Hannan and Freeman’s 
population ecology perspective. It is important to note the influence of contributions on 
organizational analysis and cognitive frames, mainly Simon (1956, 1957) and Cyert and 
March (1963), on the three crucial streams in study: the competence-based perspective, the 
contractarian approach and the population ecology approach. 
The confrontation of the distinct theoretical proposals that have been produced around the 
topic of the firm, for obvious reasons only feasible if focused on a few perspectives, tries to 
anticipate the recognition of potential flaws of the neoclassical framework. For such purpose 
the contractarian and the evolutionary approaches identified above were selected since they 
appear as two modern major contributions in the field. A confrontation is also made with the 
population ecology perspective, hoping to obtain important insights from such cross analysis. 
The next two sections cover this goal. 
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Figure 1 – The conceptualisation of the firm - from the Institutionalist Thought in Economics
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March 1963)3. THE CROSS-EXAM OF DISTINCT THEORETICAL PROPOSALS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
POTENTIAL FLAWS OF THE NEOCLASSICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 The nature of the firm, knowledge and learning  
According to Hodgson (1999: 200), Coase (1937), one of the most important authors within 
New Institutionalist Economics, did not offer a clarification why firms exist although he made 
a conceptual division between the firm and the market. He identified as a key characteristic of 
the firm the allocation of resources by command rather than by price. Following Coase (1937: 
390-1 quoted from Hodgson 1999: 200), ‘the main reason why it is profitable to establish a 
firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism … It is true that 
contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced.’ 
Coase’s work was strongly motivated in what concerns historical specificity (Hodgson 1999). 
As it was already mentioned in section 2.3, his main suggestion consisted in the identification 
of the firm in terms of organizational coordination. Such conceptualisation integrates the 
understanding that production processes involving human beings depend fundamentally upon 
spread, uncodified and tacit knowledge. Since much of this knowledge is complex and 
inaccessible neither worker nor manager can know entirely what is going on. As Hodgson 
stresses (1999: 228): ‘all production involves learning; and in principle we do not know now 
what is yet to be learned in the future. Further, production processes are generally complex to 
the degree that precise analysis and prediction are often confounded. In particular, they 
involve human actors, who are sometimes unpredictable. Finally, they are subject to uncertain 
shocks and disturbances from the outside world. Overall, key outcomes are uncertain, in the 
Keynesian and Knightian sense, and also many events and innovations are both unenvisaged 
and unforeseen.’  
Therefore, the microfoundation present in such conceptualisation – the firm seen as a 
cognitive entity (Foss: 1997) - surely gives rise to a different understanding of structural 
change and economic growth relatively to the concept of the firm as an anonymous 
production function. 
Williamson (1985), another crucial reference within NIE, also supported a conceptual 
distinction between the market and the firm. However, he proposes a concept that is narrower 
than the one pointed by Penrose, or even by Coase. Indeed, he reduces his theory to the idea 
that economic institutions such as the firm ‘have the main purpose and effect of economizing 
on transaction costs’ (Williamson 1985: 1 quoted from Hodgson 1999: 200-1).  
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insights on the concept and the nature of the firm, also making the parallelism with 
neoclassical approach. Their ambition is that modelling individual firm behaviour based on 
more detailed and realistic assumptions of individual firm’s rationality may result in the 
building of models of industry evolution able to bring new insights into the understanding of 
economic phenomena.  
The population ecology perspective appears as particularly relevant on aggregate analysis, 
with their focus on the relations between the population of organizations and the environment. 
According to Hannan and Freeman (1989), this theoretical approach is interested in 
describing the variety of organizational forms and in explaining this variety. Therefore, this 
perspective is most relevant when understandings about industry evolution and economic 
growth are in investigation. 
It is interesting to stress that both the competence-based approach and the population ecology 
theory put selection, with heterogeneity and variation as the premises for selection, at the core 
of their argumentations. As Durand (2001) points out: ‘The ecological perspective focuses on 
the way in which various strategies fit in with an environment that selects for or against these 
strategies by encouraging foundings and discouraging failures’ (Freeman 1995: 222 quoted 
from Durand 2001: 395). Evolutionary economics and the competence-based perspectives 
‘place major emphasis on the heterogeneity of the population of business firms and on the 
sources of that heterogeneity in the idiosyncratic internal features of individual firms’ (Winter 
1995: 147 quoted from Durand 2001: 395). 
A subject quite relevant in the discussion around economics of the firm and economic growth 
concerns knowledge itself. While the neoclassical and the NIE approaches deal with 
information problems, Hodgson (1999: 206) considers that the treatment of such object is 
unsatisfactory: ‘There is no distinction given between sense-data, i.e. the jumble of 
neurological stimuli which reach the brain, and information or knowledge, which involve the 
imposition of a conceptual framework. There is no regard made to the processes of 
assessment or computation with given information, which can lead to different conclusions 
depending on the method of calculation and the cognitive framework.’ The way knowledge 
and the interconnection knowledge-firm are conceived will have significant effects in 
understanding economic growth. It is important to recall that the neoclassical perspective of 
knowledge and learning is not able to capture the concept of learning as ‘an instituted process 
of interpretation, appraisal, trial, feedback, and evaluation, involving socially-transmitted 
 
16cognitive frames and routinised group practices which are often taken for granted’ (Hodgson 
1999: 256). Although organizational knowledge interacts with individual knowledge, it is 
more than the sum of the individual parts. It is context-dependent, bounded by culture and 
institutionalised (ibid.).  
On this topic of organizational knowledge the population ecology perspective is highly 
convergent with the competence-based approach. In the first place its own rationalization 
around the motivation behind the creation of an organization reveals the concept of 
knowledge adopted. Since the creation of an organization involves the mobilization of several 
scarce resources, Hannan and Freeman (1984: 152) ask ‘Why do individuals and other social 
actors agree to commit scarce resources to such expensive solutions to problems of collective 
action?’ It is important to note that they were aware of the responses offered by neoclassical 
theory: ‘The new institutional economics argues that organizations arise to fill the gaps 
created by market failure (Arrow, 1974).’ They also recognized that Williamson’s (1975) 
analysis exposed that organizations are more efficient than markets in circumstances in which 
economic transactions must be concluded, for example in the face of opportunism and 
uncertainty. Also, they recall that although sociologists have a propensity to discard the idea 
that organizations arise mainly in response to market failures, they usually agree that 
organizations have special efficiency features even if emphasizing their efficiency and 
effectiveness for the coordination of complex tasks (Hannan and Freeman 1984).  
Even if accepting the plausibility of the efficiency arguments, Hannan and Freeman (1984) do 
not recognize that they are obviously correct. They remind that many comprehensive records 
of organizational processes conduct to severe doubts that organizations minimize the costs of 
ending several sorts of transactions. Therefore, they stress distinct types of competencies. The 
first crucial one is ‘reliability’ since ‘in a world of uncertainty, potential members, investors, 
and clients may value reliability of performance more than efficiency’ (ibid.: 153). This 
means that a distinctive competence of organizations is the ability to produce collective 
actions with rather small variance in quality (ibid.). 
Another competence crucial for an organization being highly reproducible is ‘accountability’ 
as ‘the spread of norms of rationality in the modern world (…) and a variety of internal and 
external contingencies demand that organizations be able to account rationality for their 
actions’ (Hannan and Freeman 1984: 153).  
 
17The above competences help us to understand the above Hodgson’s (1999: 256) citation about 
organizational knowledge: ‘It is context-dependent, bounded by culture and institutionalised’. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984: 154) show a convergent discourse as they argue that ‘in general, 
organizations attain reproducibility of structure through processes of institutionalisation and 
by creating standardized routines’. Also, they point out that the institutional system has a 
fundamental role in legitimating the organization since it articulates the whole organization 
with the broader society (ibid.). 
Returning to the evolutionary frame, as it was already stressed, knowledge within a firm is 
basically related to the organization and the group rather than to the individuals that compose 
them (Winter 1988). According to Dosi and Marengo (1994: 162 quoted from Hodgson 1999: 
255) ‘organizational knowledge is neither presupposed nor derived from the available 
information but rather emerges as a property of the learning system as is shaped by the 
interaction among various learning processes that constitute the organization’. Foss (1997) 
also emphasizes this point when he argues that recognizing that knowledge about how to 
connect together one person’s or firm’s productive knowledge with that of another is 
imperfect, conducts to the issue of qualitative coordination.  
Learning itself must be understood as a developmental and reconstitutive process and not as a 
plain input of ‘facts’ (ibid.). In general, neoclassical economics conceives learning as the 
cumulative discovery of pre-existing ‘blueprint’ information, or Bayesian revision of 
subjective probability estimates in the light of incoming data. However, Hodgson stresses the 
presence of severe problems, for example the fact that a process of Bayesian learning in 
search of an optimum is dependent upon the existence of accurate former knowledge (Hey, 
1981 quoted from Hodgson 1999: 252). Besides, as authors such as Giovanni Dosi and 
Massimo Egidi (1991) have disputed, the Bayesian perspective is a very imperfect way of 
picture the role of learning, which is to a large extent more than a process of blueprint 
discovery or statistical adjustment (Hodgson 1999). 
3.2 Transaction costs and uncertainty 
Hodgson (1999: 201) considers essential to be conscious about the problems in providing an 
adequate definition of transaction costs. He quotes from Dahlman (1979: 144) who noted that 
the concept of transaction costs ‘has become a catch-all phrase for unspecified interferences 
with the price mechanism’. Dahlman also criticized the emblematic formal representation of 
transaction costs as a proportion of the value of exchanged goods as it works mainly as a 
 
18regular transport cost. According to Hodgson (1999), Dahlman made an important step 
forward into the deeper analysis of transaction costs. He proposed a typology for these costs 
based on three distinct and sequential phases of the exchange process: ‘search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs’. As the 
crucial common element between these three classes, Dahlman pointed that they all 
correspond to resources losses due to lack of information (Dahlman 1979: 148 quoted from 
Hodgson 1999: 204). 
Despite the recognition of Dahlman’s contribution, Hodgson considers that many problems 
still remain around the clarification of the core concept of transaction costs. A reduction of 
these costs to those of information could mean a precisely fit into a neoclassical framework 
(Hodgson 1999: 204). As a matter of fact, ‘following the lead of George Stigler’s classic 
(1961) article, search and information costs could be accommodated alongside, and treated 
similarly to, other costs in a probabilistic framework. In this approach information is treated 
just like any other commodity, and subject to the marginalist rule that its consumption is 
optimal when the marginal cost of information search and acquisition is equal to its expected 
marginal return.’ However, ‘the very idea of rational calculus of information costs is opened 
to objection. As Arrow (1962) and others have pointed out, if we lack a piece of relevant 
information then how can we have any firm expectation of its marginal return? The very fact 
that information is lacking means at most that such expectations are hazy and ill-defined. 
Clearly there is a problem of circularity here’ (Hodgson 1999: pp. 204-5). 
Hodgson also recalls that with a treatment of information as in the above terms doubts emerge 
about why market contracting is supplanted by the firm. In fact, if information is a commodity 
just like any other, there is no clear cause for the firm to proceed as the minimiser of such 
costs (Hodgson 1999). ‘More specifically, ‘search and information costs’ could be reduced 
substantially by a market agency under contract from the producer-trader association, 
‘bargaining and decision costs’ could be reduced by a team of consultants, and ‘policing and 
enforcement costs’ could be brought down by pooling information regarding the credit, 
performance and other reliability ratings of the agents involved. If informational economies of 
scale are substantial, why is it that such syndicates of independent producers should not arise 
to minimise the information costs that they would each face on their own, and thus obviate the 
need for the firm?’ Therefore, Hodgson considers that the version of the transaction costs 
argument focused on the ‘information costs’ is not capable of giving a persuasive reason for 
the existence of the firm. He recalls Loasby’s (1976) statement that ‘there is no need in theory 
 
19for non-market forms of organization in the general equilibrium model. Even the probabilistic 
version of general equilibrium theory, which implies information problems of a stylised and 
limited kind, provides no reason why firms, as such, should exist’ (Hodgson 1999: 206). 
From all the above argumentation emerges one major topic to explore when thinking about 
potential contributes from the economics of the firm for economic growth theory: risk versus 
uncertainty.  
Langlois (1986) contributed to a better understanding of the rationale of the firm, making a 
distinction between distinct types of problems of information. The argumentation was very 
close to Frank Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk and uncertainty (Hodgson 1999). 
According to Langlois, ‘parametric uncertainty’ (Knight’s ‘risk’) cannot be used to find the 
cause of the transaction costs that are relevant to explain the relative efficiency of a firm. Neil 
Kay (1984) offered a similar argumentation, showing that the firm in a neoclassical world of 
perfect knowledge lacks most of its familiar structures and functions. As such there is ‘a close 
affinity between perfect knowledge and risk in terms of homogeneity and replicability of 
associated events. The argument leads inexorably to the consideration of true or radical 
uncertainty as an essential concept to understand economic institutions such as the firm’ 
(Hodgson 1999: 206). 
The above argumentations mean a return to Knight’s (1921) core idea that the existence of the 
firm in the real world is the result of the presence of uncertainty (Knight 1921: 271 quoted 
from Hodgson 1999: 207). Motivated by such reasoning, Hodgson concludes that ‘an answer 
to Coases’s question as to why firms exist re-emerged in terms of a non-probabilistic concept 
of uncertainty’ (Hodgson 1999: 207). This means a restatement that the concept of transaction 
costs must be mainly associated to problems of radical uncertainty and lack of knowledge. 
Also, the nature of the firm itself is anchored in Knight’s perspective: the need to reduce 
uncertainty. 
It is interesting to focus that both the evolutionary perspective and the population ecology 
theory offer an option designed to shelter actors against radical uncertainty (or Durand's 
(2001) causal ambiguity) and diminish the probability of being selected out (ibid.). Population 
ecology theory supports institutionalisation through accountability and reliability as a process 
that helps newcomers to find the appropriate organizational form that has the best 
probabilities of survival (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Evolutionary economics proposes the 
concept of routine as a device to avoid a firm’s satisfactory procedures from being 
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the best way to cut the level of causal ambiguity rising through the threat of inter-
organizational knowledge transfer, as pictured for example in Teece et. al. (1997).  
3.3 Rationality 
The problem of rationality is usually present among discussions focused on distinct 
theoretical contributions. Therefore, another issue that may be relevant here is the concept of 
rationality adopted by the several streams. 
According to Nelson and Winter (1982: p. ix), ‘there is much more to be said on the problem 
of rational behavior in the world of reality than can be adequately stated in the language of 
orthodox economic theory.’ Instead of assuming a rational maximizing behaviour, Nelson and 
Winter inspired on Simon (1955, 1956) and on his insights into human and organizational 
behaviour, proposed a theory where firms are motivated by profit and engage in search 
aiming to improve their profits, but their actions are not understood as profit maximizing over 
exogenous and well-defined choice sets (Nelson and Winter 1982). The theory they proposed 
stresses the predisposition for the most profitable firms to drive the less profitable ones out of 
business. Though, they do not centred the analysis on supposed states of industry equilibrium 
featured by the presence of all the profitable firms at their desired size and the absence of all 
the unprofitable ones. Within this frame, the modelling approach employed by Nelson and 
Winter (1982: 4) is such that the ‘firms are modeled as simply having, at any given time, 
certain capabilities and decision rules. Over time these capabilities and rules are modified as a 
result of both deliberate problem-solving efforts and random events. And over time, the 
economic analogue of natural selection operates as the market determines which firms are 
profitable and which are unprofitable, and tends to winnow out the latter.’  
On this last argumentation made by evolutionists on selection we find a fracture between such 
approach and the population ecology theory. As it was already mentioned on section 2.3 there 
are other reasons beyond profitability and efficiency important for explaining selection within 
organizational populations, namely reliability, accountability and legitimacy (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977, 1984). Sequentially, the founders of the population ecology theory state the 
following three assumptions: 1) ´Selection in populations of organizations in modern societies 
favors forms with high reliability of performance and high levels of accountability’; 2) 
‘Reliability and accountability require that organizational structures be highly reproducible’; 
3) ‘High levels of reproducibility of structure generate strong inertial pressures’, which 
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organizations in modern societies favors organizations whose structures have high inertia’ 
(Hannan and Freeman 1984: pp. 154-5). This theoretical divergence about selection among 
organizations may be important to understand the role of institutional systems on economic 
growth processes.   
About the cognitive capacity of actors in general, population ecologists share a conception of 
bounded rationality since individuals alone are unable to recognize the real sources of success 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977). This means that selection is only recognized ex post and 
materialized in its outcomes (Durand 2001).  
Within neoclassical theory, firms operate following a set of decision rules that determine what 
they do as a function of external and internal conditions (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 12). Those 
rules reflect firms’ maximizing behaviour. In a maximization model of firm behaviour Nelson 
and Winter identify three distinct parts: ‘1) specification of what it is the firms in the industry 
are seeking to maximize – usually profit or present value, but in some cases the objective is 
something different or more complex; 2) specification of a set of things that the firms know 
how to do’, which may be on production in a traditional sense or comprise other things a firm 
knows how to do such as advertising policies or financial ones; 3) ‘a firm’s action can be 
viewed as the result of a choice of the action that maximizes the degree to which its objective 
is achieved, given its set of known alternative actions, market constraints, and perhaps other 
internal constraints. … In some models, the representation of maximizing behavior takes into 
account information imperfections, costs, and constraints.’ 
On the structure of evolutionary models Nelson and Winter (1982: 14) stress that ‘the 
decision rules employed by firms form a basic operational concept’ as in the neoclassical 
theoretical frame. However, they strongly reject the neoclassical concept of rationality based 
on maximizing behaviour as the explanation of why decision rules are as they are. As they 
point out their evolutionary theory give out the three parts of the neoclassical maximization 
model: ‘the global objective function, the well-defined choice set, and the maximizing choice 
rationalization of firms’ actions.’  
Despite the recognition that some neoclassical theoretical models such as models of optimal 
search and models of sequential decision making appear not to work on a ‘once-and-for-all’ 
optimisation, Nelson and Winter (1982: 31) consider that only superficially those modelling 
efforts fall outside the above critique. As a matter of fact what they do is a ‘once-and-for-all 
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to Nelson and Winter, must be that the actors in neoclassical models are not able to deal with 
truly unanticipated information.  
The ‘once-and-for-all’ optimisation neoclassical set is inconsistent with, for example, an 
assumption that the firm works at all times with a current policy, which profitability is 
compared in inaccurate terms, from time to time, with individual alternatives that present 
themselves by processes not entirely under its control, and changes policies when the 
comparison favours the presented alternative over the current status quo (Nelson and Winter 
1982). ‘This latter assumption is more on the spirit of the evolutionary theory: it is an 
assumption of ‘profit seeking’ or ‘profit-motivated striving’, but certainly not of profit 
maximization’ (ibid.: 31). 
Nelson and Winter (1982) call out the attention for the fact that in a suitably calm and 
repetitive decision context, the difference between motivated for profit and profit 
maximization may be of a little moment, but in contexts of important change it is significantly 
relevant. Strict loyalty to optimization concepts strongly encourages (or even requires) closing 
the eyes to essential characteristics of change: the incidence of Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 
1921), the multiplicities of opinions, the problems of the decision process itself, the 
importance of problem-solving heuristics, the plausible magnitude and range of actions 
recognized expost as misguided, and so forth (ibid.). 
The analysis of firm organization and strategy implicitly, at least, involve the acceptance of a 
concept of bounded rationality (Nelson and Winter 1982). As a matter of fact, ‘the economic 
world is far too complicated for a firm to understand perfectly; therefore the attempts of firms 
to do well must be understood as being conditional by their subjective models or 
interpretations of economic reality. These interpretations tend to be associated with strategies 
that firms consciously device to guide their actions. Such strategies differ from firm to firm, 
in part because of different interpretations of economic opportunities and constraints and in 
part because different firms are good at different things. In turn, the capabilities of a firm are 
embedded in its organizational structure, which is better adapted to certain strategies than to 
others. Thus, strategies at any time are constrained by organization’ (ibid.: 37). This 
‘satisfacing’ behaviour does not occur simply because of inadequate information, but also 
because it would be hard to execute the calculations even if the appropriate information was 
available. 
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mainstream dominates the contractual approach, which recognizes that transaction costs as a 
concept is inevitably tied up with information problems and uncertainty, also embracing 
bounded rationality.  
For Williamson (1985: 32 quoted from Hodgson 1999: 207) ‘economizing in transaction costs 
essentially reduces to economizing on bounded rationality’. However, as Hodgson remarks, 
‘in practice, Williamson seems to incline to rationality rather than behaviouralism, at least 
when it comes to ‘choosing’ the more efficient governance structure’. So, the transaction cost 
analysis materializes the choice of administratively rational actions itself a substantively 
rational choice (ibid. 1999: 207).  
The above perspective cannot be accepted if we remember that the concept of bounded 
rationality does not mean only problems in gathering information but focus primarily the fact 
that man’s rationality is bounded in the sense that the decision problems that emerge in real-
life are far too complex to understand and so firms cannot maximize over the set of all 
feasible alternatives (Nelson and Winter 1982). As a consequence, they follow simple 
decision rules as guiders of action. These rules cannot be featured as ‘optimal’ in the sense 
that they result from a global calculation that considers all information and decision costs. 
Nevertheless, they may be very satisfactory for the firms’ goal, that is firms ‘satisfice’ (ibid.: 
35). This idea of ‘satisfacing’ was put forward precisely by Simon (1955, 1959) and also by 
Cyert and March (1963). This behaviouralist response may be relevant to understand 
differences on explicit theories of industrial behaviour and economic growth, although they 
are concerned with individual firm behaviour.  
4 CONTRACTARIAN VERSUS COMPETENCE-BASED AND THE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
THEORY:  A SYSTEMATISATION WITH SOME INSIGHTS FROM ECOLOGY POPULATION 
THEORY 
The emergence of NIE and the renewal of competence-based approach in the 1970s meant the 
introduction of institutions in economists’ research agenda. However, the analysis of the 
economic outcomes of institutions is still rather poor in central economic fields (Olsson 
1999). Within the mainstream approach areas of research such as growth theory, the existence 
and importance of institutions are barely recognized at all, and when they are documented, 
they are merely assumed as given (ibid). Therefore, it is rather important to consider if 
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insights into industrial change and economic growth theories. 
The contractarian approach have three crucial features that are rejected by the competence-
based analysis of the firm (Hodgson 1999): i) the assumption of given individuals, typically 
with given and independent preference functions; ii) the study of the firm is reduced to 
contracts between individuals repeatedly involving the minimisation of transaction costs; iii) a 
focus on comparative static rationalization, where one organizational arrangement is 
considered to have lower transaction costs than another. 
The first key characteristic of the contractarian perspective means that the basic starting point 
of analysis consists in the transactions between the given individuals, being assumed that all 
such transactions are evaluated by the individuals in terms of unidimensional utility levels 
(Hodgson 1999). Following Hodgson (1999) this directs to a disregard of the limits of 
contracts and exchange and the need of non-contractual relations, above all loyalty and trust, 
and also a neglect of processes of major individual transformation and development, 
remarkably an adequate concept of learning. Furthermore, this individualistic perspective 
eliminates notions such as organizational learning and group knowledge, resulting in an 
overlook of the types of skill and knowledge associated with teams. Consequently, an analysis 
in terms of economic growth based on such a conceptualisation of the economic agent 
necessarily overlooks the impact of learning on structural change and on economic growth.  
The neoclassical idea of learning as a cumulative process involving the acquisition of 
codifiable knowledge, whereas learning itself appears as informational absorption is rather 
reductionist (Cohendet and Steinmuller, 2000). Learning engages acquisition of cognitive 
frames but it is an open-ended, provisional and potentially fallible process (Hodgson 1999). 
Moreover, learning is fundamentally a process of problem-formulating and problem-solving 
which means that it involves conjecture and error (ibid.).  
Also, the contractarian analysis is focused on how given, cost-minimising or utility-
maximizing individuals relate to each other to shape and maintain institutions, that is the 
interaction between individuals is reduced to the calculus of costs and the social institutions 
are not taken seriously enough as the organization is reduced to the position of a way of 
regulating relationships in default of market relations. The possibility of individual preference 
functions themselves being shaped by culture and institutions is ignored. Institutions and 
culture do not affect the individuals fundamentally (Hodgson 1999). Once more, an aggregate 
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individuals and culture. We may recall that the interaction organization-environment is at the 
core of the population ecology perspective’s argumentation. 
The second typical feature of the contractarian approach identified above – the conception of 
the firm as focused on the alleged contracts between individuals connotes a neglect of 
technology and production (Hodgson 1999). This happens because this perspective considers 
the existence of a uniform technology over distinct governance modes that conducts to a 
partition of production and technology from governance structures or transaction costs. The 
main analytical concern is with efforts to obtain the optimal benefit from the given resources, 
with the transaction costs argument assuming that production costs are given and not distinct 
across governance or transaction modes. Nonetheless, usually technologies are associated to 
structures of governance and transaction modes. So, the role of production and technology is 
ignored while the emphasis is put on the choice of governance structures and the efficient 
allocation of given resources, instead on production, accumulation and growth (ibid.).  
Although considering that the Coasen literature respects a dichotomy between production 
costs and transaction costs, Langlois and Foss (1997) recognize that some of the contributions 
within such literature depict effects between production and exchange. The authors point out 
that some recent research has demonstrated rigorously that alternative organizational 
structures might be selected since they involve different incentives to invest in specific assets 
(Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995). Therefore, in many recent models, technology and 
organizational structure are determined jointly (Riordan and Williamson 1985; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990).  
A third characteristic of the contractarian perspective is its focus on comparative static 
explanations, meaning a poor treatment or even overlook of dynamic facets of the problem, 
mainly learning, innovation and technological development (Hodgson 1999). Typically the 
analysis is conducted based on the comparison of transaction costs in equilibrium in two or 
more governance structures, whereas the structure with lowest costs is believed to be more 
efficient (ibid.). In the real world firms and markets are featured by different capabilities, 
facing dynamic and disequilibria situations and NIE downplayed such reality (ibid.). The 
acceptance of an equilibrium analytical approach by that perspective implies the neglect of the 
difference between ex ante and ex post forms of coordination (ibid.: 259): ‘Firms, through 
foresight and planning can have advantages ex ante; markets typically coordinate ex post. 
This possible and additional reason for the existence of firms is ignored in equilibrium and 
 
26comparative static analyses.’ Therefore, the ability of the firm to promote human learning, 
technological innovation, and research and development is not understood by such a static 
frame. 
It is within a dynamic frame that the firm is conceived both in population ecology perspective 
and in evolutionary theory as having a low short-run capacity for strategic reorientation. The 
evolutionary concept of path dependency accounts precisely for time stickiness in strategic 
action (Dosi and Nelson 1994). More generally, the competence-based perspective points to 
the difficulties and costs involved in augmenting strategies, also focusing that it can generally 
only occur incrementally (Teece et. al. 1997: 529 quoted from Durand 2001: 397). 
For the above reasoning the most feasible picture conceives an organization committing itself 
to long-term paths. This commitment is related with a certain idea of ‘uniqueness’ (Levinthal 
1995: 36 quoted from Durand 2001: 397). Population ecology believes in niche strategy as a 
meticulous model of fitting into environmental circumstances. This niche strategy keeps a 
firm against selection (Carroll 1985). Evolutionary economics emphasizes the power of 
innovation versus imitation, with innovation being a device to create uniqueness. The 
dynamic capability perspective shows how uniqueness and idiosyncrasy guide a firm to 
appropriate rents unreachable to competitors due to the effects of isolating mechanisms 
(Mahoney and Pandian 1992 quoted from Durand 2001: 397). 
All the above convergent items found between evolutionary theory and population ecology 
perspective are clearly distinguishable from other available theories. For example, the 
neoclassical vision on survival and selection does not usually incorporate concepts such as 
process or bounded rationality, favouring those such as equilibrium and optimisation. Causal 
ambiguity is mainly missing from agency theory, as is uniqueness from neo-institutionalism 
(Aldrich 2000 quoted from Durand 2001). About more recent models of organizational and 
economic evolutions, usually they do not privilege selection, but rather adaptation (Durand 
2001). These models list distinctive variations at the organizational level, and employ 
adaptation to connect organizational behaviour to the competitive and institutional 
environment levels (Lewin et. al. 1999 quoted from Durand 2001: 397). 
In spite of the convergent points listed above, evolutionary and population ecology 
perspectives differ in some ways. To start, it is important to stress that each approach chooses 
a different unit to be selected, though belonging to connected levels of analysis. Population 
ecology works with populations of organizations. Evolutionary economics mainly chooses 
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based sight focuses on resources, competencies, and trajectories. Nevertheless, there is a deep 
affiliation between the diverse levels. Durand (2001) sees each level as a stratum of selection 
at which organizational units are either engaged or eliminated. 
The understanding about selection offered by each theory also diverges on the location of the 
selecting forces. It is relevant to notice that external selection relates to forces external to an 
organization that influence its routines and competencies. Internal selection concerns forces 
internal to an organization that influence its routine and competencies (Aldrich 2000 quoted 
from Durand 2001). Population ecology is clearly focused on the first type while evolutionary 
economics, and above all the capability approach, stress the latter (Durand 2001). 
Another difference between the theories in focus concerns the position of strategic 
management within the performance of organizations. Whereas for population ecology, 
strategy has, at best, a reflexive role since strategic management cannot have a major impact 
on an organization’s chance to survive (Durand 2001), the capacity approach clearly point out 
an active task for strategic management by defining processes, building positions, and 
controlling paths and trajectories (Teece et. al. 1997 quoted from Durand 2001). Evolutionary 
economics embraces distinct positions about this item. Durand (2001: 398) recalls Nelson 
(1991: 70) and his conviction that ‘to an extent, the market is selecting on strategies and 
companies, as well as new technologies’, and so the role of strategic management is also 
understood as mostly reactive, and points out to the replication strategy (Winter and Szulanski 
1999) as approaches that offer a premium to strategy in avoiding being selected out. 
As we have already focused, recent neoclassical analyses tried to deal with the future 
picturing the concept of risk and introducing it into their models. Faced with uncertain 
environments, models assume that agents are able to calculate numeric probabilities for 
distinct and pre-conceived events. However, the evolutionary theorizing does not accept such 
procedure as it regards future knowledge as unknown and the results of activities closely 
associated to the dynamic and interactive learning process as uncertain in the most radical 
sense as in Knight (1921) or Keynes (1936) (Hodgson 1999). Therefore, the existence of 
uncertainty as so means the impossibility to reduce the future to the present using 
probabilistic risk calculation, being impossible the existence of complete future markets for 
all innovations and knowledge.  
 
28Since Knight (1921) it has been suggested the importance of the firm as a decisive instrument 
to deal with such complex and uncertain world: ‘the firm may cope with uncertainties by 
lumping them together within a single organization, which has resources to bear many non 
quantifiable and unforeseeable shocks’ (Hodgson 1999: 259). Mainstream has been proposing 
analyses of economic growth based on, as it was cited already in section 1, a different concept 
of the firm – the firm as an ‘anonymous production function’ (Foss 1997: 37).  
We believe that the economic understanding of growth and development of human societies 
will strongly benefit from a conceptualisation of the firm able to capture the ‘spirit’ of the 
Knightian firm. In our perspective, the great challenge is, based on such a micro 
conceptualisation, to walk towards the construction of formal interactions between the micro 
and the aggregate levels. 
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